Networks remain vulnerable

Infrastructure above our heads and beneath our feet
Satellites and submarine cables form the backbone of global communications. However, both systems are increasingly exposed to security-related, technical and physical risks. Namibia is directly affected and its networks remain very vulnerable.
Frank Steffen
  • 1 Day Ago

When the Russian military satellite Cosmos 2612 approached ICEYE’s X36 radar satellite, operated by Finnish company ICEYE, to within a few hundred metres in mid-October, concerns were raised. Reuters reported, citing US space analyst Greg Gillinger, that Russia may have been rehearsing an attack on Western satellites.

Two further Russian satellites are reportedly now following another ICEYE satellite. Experts point out, however, that such close approaches may also be intended for observation or inspection. On their own, they do not prove that an attack is being planned.

According to the US satellite catalogue CelesTrak, more than 17 000 active satellites were in orbit at the beginning of November 2026. The European Space Agency (ESA) counted approximately 15 800 operational satellites. The difference reflects the organisations' different tracking and classification methods.

The largest operators include SpaceX, with its Starlink constellation, as well as state actors in the United States, China and Russia. Satellites support communications, weather observation, navigation and military reconnaissance. Private providers are increasingly supplying infrastructure that is also important to armed forces, as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated.

Collisions, physical damage, electronic interference and cyberattacks can disrupt or disable these systems. According to the ESA, millions of pieces of space debris further increase the risk of collisions.


Who regulates space?

The 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty prohibits countries from claiming national ownership of outer space and requires states to use it for peaceful purposes. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) coordinates radio frequencies and orbital positions to prevent interference between satellite systems.

There is, however, no central global authority responsible for monitoring and managing satellite traffic. The European Union (EU) therefore emphasises the importance of international cooperation and transparency.

Namibia relies on satellites and terrestrial data networks for international communications, navigation and weather services. Satellites can provide coverage in remote areas and serve as an alternative when terrestrial infrastructure fails.

As previously reported by Network Media Hub (NMH), Telecom Namibia’s ageing telecommunications systems are increasingly experiencing problems, with replacement parts no longer always available. Farmers and rural communities, in particular, are struggling to access reliable and affordable communications. Starlink appeared to offer an obvious alternative, but the satellite provider is currently not permitted to operate commercially in Namibia.


CRAN's rejection of Starlink

The Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia (CRAN) rejected Starlink’s licence application in March 2026. Among the reasons cited were its failure to meet the requirement for majority Namibian ownership, regulatory non-compliance and security concerns.

Critics suspect the decision may have been driven by economic interests, arguing that MTC could be being protected from a new competitor. Although the mobile network operator is listed on the stock exchange, it remains majority state-owned. Through state-owned Namibia Post and Telecommunications Holdings, the government holds 60.13% of the shares. A further 28.67% belongs to the Government Institutions Pension Fund (GIPF), while the remaining 11.2% is held by other shareholders.


Internet backbone

According to the ITU, approximately 99% of international data traffic is carried by submarine cables. These cables transport communications, financial transactions and cloud services.

Namibia is directly connected to two major cable systems. The West Africa Cable System (WACS) was brought ashore in Swakopmund by Telecom Namibia in 2011. Its original design capacity is 5.12 terabits per second (Tbps). In its National Emergency Telecommunications Plan 2025–2030, Telecom Namibia refers to the system’s age and previous outages.

The Equiano cable, financed by Google, was activated in Namibia in 2023. Paratus and Telecom Namibia use the infrastructure. According to Paratus, Equiano has 12 fibre pairs and a design capacity of 144 Tbps.

In 2024, Telecom Namibia confirmed the activation of a 100-gigabit connection between Swakopmund and Johannesburg. However, the 144 Tbps figure refers to the cable’s total capacity, not Namibia’s share. The bandwidth actually available to the country depends on contractual arrangements and network utilisation.

SAT-3/SAFE, ACE and EASSy supplement the regional cable network. For Namibia, they are primarily relevant through international and terrestrial connections. The planned South Atlantic Regional Submarine Cable System (SARSSy) is intended to provide additional redundancy and reduce dependence on existing cable systems.


How vulnerable are these connections?

Submarine cables can be damaged by ship anchors, fishing activities, technical faults, underwater landslides or sabotage.

In March 2024, damage to four cable systems off West Africa caused significant disruptions in 13 African countries, including Namibia. Namibia’s own emergency telecommunications plan also warns of the consequences of such outages.

Satellites can provide an alternative connection, provided suitable services are available, authorised to operate and have sufficient capacity. Conversely, cables can carry traffic that might otherwise place additional demand on satellite networks. Neither system, however, can fully replace the other: their capacities, costs and technical limitations differ.

For Namibia, the crucial factor is therefore not simply the total theoretical capacity of these systems, but how much bandwidth is actually secured and whether independent connections are available in an emergency. The country’s digital security depends on how effectively this infrastructure is protected against outages, sabotage and geopolitical tensions.